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WAR IN THE FAR EAST 
THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN MANCHURIA 
The Soviet Challenge to Capitalism 
MANCHURIA lies in the northeastern corner of China. Be-
tween it and the United States lies the vast Pacific. But dol-
lars have annihilated distance and brought Manchuria into the 
life of the American worker. American capitalism in its rapid 
expansion abroad has come into conflict with rival capitalist 
powers, and Manchuria is one of the points where the conflict 
is sharpest. Not only is Manchuria the battleground of rival 
imperialist nations ; it is also a strategic sector in the attack 
which the imperialist powers are directing against the Soviet 
Union. 
Daily the campaign against the Soviet Union gathers mo-
mentum. Under the guise of safeguarding religious liberty, 
political democracy, the virtue of womanhood or the purity 
of the white race, the capitalist press of the world carries on 
a relentless propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union ; 
mobilizes mass sentiment for a holy crusade. 
The slogans change. Outworn myths no longer useful in 
whipping up anti-Soviet sentiment are discarded for new ones. 
Tales of atrocities against innocent priests are substituted for 
stories about the nationalization of women. There is a rapid 
turnover in the lies which serve as pretexts for the anti-Soviet 
campaign; but the reason for the campaign remains funda-
mentally the same. The Soviet Union is a workers' dictatorship 
engaged in building socialism. It is a challenge to the capitalist 
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world, to the bankers and factory owners and their . press, 
priests and rabbis. Every day the friction between these two 
worlds sJ:larpens. Every step in the socialist construction of 
the Soviet Union, every economic program realized, every 
factory constructed by Soviet workers is a challenge to the 
capitalist world. 
Now the Soviet Union is engaged in the difficult task of 
collectivizing agriculture. For the tiny farms, owned by in-
dividual peasants, worked by primitive methods, it is substi-
tuting collective farms, owned by groups of peasants and 
operated scientifically. That means a huge stride forward in 
socialist construction. It means the death of the peasant 
proprietor and the birth of a new type of peasant, a soCially 
conscious worker in a collective enterprise; it means shorter 
hours and higher standards of living for the peasant; it means 
the incorporation of the peasant into the socialist fabric of 
the Soviet Union; it means scientific farming, increased pro-
duction and large wheat exports. 
The revolution in Russian agriculture coupled with the 
amazingly rapid development of Soviet industry has alarmed 
world capitalism. Leslie Urquhart, well-known British capi-
talist, recently wrote: 
We are all firmly imbued with the opinion that if the Soviet gov-
ernment succeeds wilh its five year program of rehabilitation of 
Russian industry, this will put into their hands financial resources 
that will destroy or at least do the greatest possible harm to our 
civilization. 
Urquhart is right. The triumph of socialist construction in 
the Soviet Union is a blow to capitalism. The Soviet Union 
has its difficulties. Nevertheless, it strides ahead building its 
industry, collectivizing its farms, increasing production, rais-
ing standards of living. Unable to obtain credits abroad, it 
increases its exports and undersells its capitalist competitors 
in order to obtain funds to purchase the machinery which it 
needs. Soviet exports are still relatively small; but they be-
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come increasingly significant in view of the capitalist struggle 
for world markets. European capitalists have for some time 
expressed alarm at the possibility of increased Soviet exports. 
Now even a large number of American business men are agi-
tating against Soviet products. Pennsylvania mine owners are 
demanding the exclusion of Soviet coal, and northwestern 
lumber barons are trying to prevent the importation of Soviet 
lumber. The Journal of Commerce expresses alarm at the rapid 
growth of Soviet iron and steel production ; the midwest 
Economist declares that the proposed increase in Russian 
wheat production menaces American agriculture. This agita-
tion against Soviet exports is not yet very great; but it repre-
sents an important tendency. Capitalist organs like the Busi-
ness Week point out that the development of Soviet trade 
"not only strengthens the Soviet regime, but lays the way 
open to destructive price competition." 
Within the capitalist countries there is a steady intensifica-
tion of the forces impelling the campaign against the Soviet 
Union. Economic crises, an inevitable feature of capitalist 
economy, decreased wages, the growth of unemployment and 
the consequent shrinkage of home markets all accelerate the 
drive for foreign markets and intensify the campaign against 
the Soviet Union which enters the export field as a young 
but formidable rival. At the same time the capitalists find an 
energetic anti-Soviet campaign necessary to stem the growing 
restlessness of workers in their countries. The Soviet Union, 
with its socialized planned economy, can increase wages, de-
crease hours, and reduce unemployment while increasing pro-
duction. In the capitalist countries, increased production is 
achieved only by speeding up workers, lowering wages, in-
creasing unemployment and lengthening hours. To keep the 
masses of workers from realizing these facts, to stem the 
growth of revolutionary sentiment, the propaganda agencies 
maintain their barrage against the Soviet Union. 
The anti-Soviet campaign is waged along the diplomatic as 
well as the economic front. Press correspondents reported that 
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the "shadow of the Soviet Union" loomed large at the London 
naval conference. That is probably quite true. France and 
England have created elaborate political alliances aimed 
against the Soviet Union. The general staffs of the Baltic 
states, of France and Poland, of Germany and Britain are 
busy preparing plans for military movements against the 
Soviet Union. In the Far East, Japan, through her control 
of an elaborate network of railways in Korea and Manchuria, 
can strike at the Soviet Union. 
Imperialist Rivalries 
The joint campaign against the U.S.S.R. does not mean 
that the powers are united. The imperialist nations are sharply 
divided among themselves. Hoover and MacDonald may issue 
unctuous statements that "war between the United States and 
Great Britain is unthinkable." But they know better. They 
build cruisers. The London Conference clearly revealed the 
intensification of the forces driving the United States and 
Great Britain to war. Their struggle for markets, colonies, raw 
materials, and military superiority is more intense than ever. 
The London Conference, far from reducing naval armaments, 
increased the fighting strength of the American, British and 
Japanese navies. 
One of the richest prizes over which the imperialist powers 
are struggling is China. And in no part of China have inter-
national rivalries been sharper than in the Manchurian prov-
inces. One bloody war has already been fought over Manchuria. 
Another one may be. 
The Struggle for Manchuria 
Manchuria consists of the three northeastern provinces of 
China-Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang. It is for the most 
part a vast undulating plain, whose fertile soil is suitable for 
the cultivation of wheat, millet, maize, barley and legumes ; 
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but more important economically are the mountains that 
flank Manchuria on the east and west. Rich in lumber and 
containing valuable deposits of iron and coal, these moun-
tains, particularly the East Mountain Highlands, near the 
Manchurian border, have been coveted by foreign powers. 
Only at the south does Manchuria touch the sea. Here the 
Liaotung Peninsula juts far into the Gulf of Pechili, providing 
an outlet for Manchurian agricultural produce, iron, coal and 
lumber. Here are two excellent ports, Dairen and Port Arthur, 
both free from ice all the year round, and therefore of great 
strategic importance. To the east and south of Manchuria 
lies Korea, and east of Korea across the Japan Sea is Japan, 
the only industrialized nation in the Orient. To the north of 
Manchuria are the vast Siberian plains absorbed by the Rus-
sian Empire in its march towards the east. 
The struggle for control of Manchuria began as early as 
rBgs. Manchuria was the point where the Japanese Empire-
attempting to extend its control on the Asiatic mainland-
and the Russian Empire met and clashed. Japan, a highly 
industrialized nation, relatively overpopulated, poor in raw 
materials, looked eagerly towards the Asiatic mainland as a 
market for its manufactured goods and capital exports, as a 
source of raw materials and a convenient outlet for its surplus 
population. Japan needed iron and coal for its factories. These 
it possessed in insufficient quantities. Across the sea lay Man-
churia, with coal resources equal to Japan's (about four bil-
lion tons) and iron resources ten times as large as Japan's. 
Nominally Manchuria was a part of the decadent Chinese 
empire; actually it was a rich prize to be seized by an enter-
prising imperialist power. 
Japan first attempted to gain control of Korea directly 
across the sea. In the Sino-Japanese War (r894) that followed 
Japanese expansion in Korea, the Chinese were completely 
routed. By the treaty of Shimonoseki China was compelled to 
recognize the independence of Korea and to cede to Japan the 
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Liaotung Peninsula with its rich mines and strategic seaports. 
The treaty alarmed the Russian imperialists, who themselves 
wished to obtain the Liaotung Peninsula in their quest for a 
"warm water" outlet on the Asiatic continent, as an eventual 
substitute for Vladivostok, ice-bound more than half the year. 
At that time, too, the Russian government was planning to 
extend the great trans-Siberian railroad along the banks of 
the Amur River to Vladivostok. The construction of the rail-
road across Manchuria to Vladivostok would shorten the 
distance s6o miles, carry the railroad through a more pro-
ductive country and extend Russian imperialist influence into 
Manchuria. These were the considerations that prompted Rus-
sia, later joined by France and Germany, to warn Japan that 
the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula was a menace to the 
peace of the Far East and therefore highly inadvisable. Japan 
knew how to take a hint and returned Liaotung, receiving 
instead a large indemnity. 
Having forced her rival from Manchuria, Russia now pro-
ceeded to grab it herself. Russia's first step was to form the 
Russo-Chinese Bank in St. Petersburg. In addition to ordinary 
banking operations the bank was authorized to collect duties 
and coin money in China and to acquire railway and tele-
graph concessions. Russia utilized the bank to secure the val-
uable Chinese Eastern Railroad concession in 1896. According 
to the secret treaty with China which authorized the railroad, 
one of the purposes of the road was "to facilitate the access 
of Russian land troops to menaced points in case of war with 
Japan." As early as 1896, the Russian imperialists clearly 
realized that the struggle for Manchuria was certain to end 
in war. 
The Chinese Eastern agreement was so broad that it gave 
Russian imperialism control over the whole of northern Man-
churia: Ostensibly the railroad was a private enterprise. 
Actually it was controlled by the Czarist government. The 
statutes of the railroad conformed to Russian law. The rail-
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road itself was administered by a Russian manager. Russian 
troops moved through the railroad zone without interference. 
Russian traders shipped goods to and from Manchuria without 
paying the full Chinese customs duties. Russian bureaucrats 
and generals dictated Manchurian life and politics. By subse-
quent agreements, Russia pushed her way farther south. In 
r8g8 she acquired the right to extend the Chinese Eastern 
to the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula and secured a twenty-five-
year lease over Port Arthur and Dairen. Thus Russia realized 
her ambition to extend her railway system from European 
Russia to ice-free ports on the Pacific. 
During the construction of the Chinese Eastern, the railway 
zone was virtually reduced to the status of a Russian colony. 
Russians ruled the territory. Villages and towns were laid out 
and populated by Russian immigrants. But it is not enough 
to loot; one must safeguard one's spoils. In r899 Russia 
reached an agreement with Britain. She promised not to seek 
railroad concessions in the Yangtse basin, in return for which 
Britain promised not to seek railway concessions in Man-
churia. During the Boxer rebellion, a result of Chinese rest-
lessness under foreign exploitation, Russian troops poured into 
Manchuria and slaughtered thousands of Chinese. Even after 
the imperialist powers had crushed the rebellion, Russia con-
tinued to maintain troops in Manchuria. Japan, which was 
apprehensively watching the Russian advance to the south 
and Russian attempts to gain a foothold in Korea, demanded 
the withdrawal of Russian troops, at the same time offering 
to recognize Russian "interests" in Manchuria if Russia would 
recognize Japanese "interests" in Korea. When Russia refused 
to make a definite reply, Japan, with the tacit support of her 
ally, England, declared war, won a decisive victory and 
wrested from Russia the Liaotung lease, Russian railway 
rights in South Manchuria, and valuable coal and iron mines. 
Thus South Manchuria became a Japanese "sphere of in-
fluence." 
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"Uncle Sam" in Manchuria 
In this early struggle for the control of Manchuria, the 
United States took no active part. The United States at this 
time was interested in China chiefly as a market for exports 
rather than investment. She was not particularly concerned 
over the scramble for Manchurian railways; but she was wor-
ried about the special trade privileges and reduced tariff rates 
which other powers had wrested from China. In 1899, the 
American Secretary of State John Hay, as spokesman for 
American manufacturers interested in exports to China, ad-
dressed his "open door" notes to the principal imperialist 
powers, asking them to guarantee equal opportunities for trade 
in China and to permit the application of Chinese customs 
duties within their spheres of influences. These demands re-
flected the dominant interests of the United States in China, 
which at the time were manufacturing and commercial rather 
than financial. Hay was quite near-sighted. He ignored the 
battle for the control of Chinese railways and left to his 
successors the job of securing for American bankers as well 
as industrialists "equal rights" to exploit China. For the next 
two decades, the State Department fought furious diplomatic 
battles to secure the privilege of participating in the scramble 
for Chinese loans and railways. 
One American authority, C. Walter Young, expressing the 
views of the State Department, writes: 
The period from 1905 to 1915 exhibited in Manchuria the in-
evitable conflict between the policy of the "open door" and the 
assertion of treaty rights which, while legally valid and enforceable 
in themselves, constituted in fact limitations on the general assertion 
of policy characterized as the "open door." 
Translate these legalistic terms into concrete political terms 
and one gets an accurate picture of the period-i.e., a long 
drawn out struggle between the European powers, which had 
an early start in China, and the United States, a late con-
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tender in the impeyialist struggle. The United States enun-
ciated the noble doctrine of the "open door" as a means of 
edging its way into the battle for Chinese concessions. 
In 1905 E. H. Harriman, American railroad magnate who 
with his bankers, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., had helped finance Japan 
in its war with Russia, attempted to gain control of the South 
Manchurian railroad as part of an ambitious scheme for 
establishing a round-the-world transportation system. Harri-
man dreamed of eventually reaching an agreement with the 
trans-Siberian railroad and linking it by means of the South 
Manchurian with his transcontinental system by means of a 
fleet of steamers on the Pacific and from the Baltic across the 
Atlantic. In 1905 li.e succeeded in reaching a tentative agree-
ment with Japanese representatives for joint American-
Japanese control of the South Manchurian; but the Japanese 
government, afraid to permit the United States a foothold in 
Manchuria, dropped the plan. Harriman then unsuccessfully 
tried to buy the Chinese Eastern from the Czarist government. 
Not at all discouraged by these failures, the Harriman in-
terests decided to build a railroad of their own. In October, 
1909, they received permission from the Chinese government 
to build a railroad from Chinchow, on the coast of South 
Manchuria, up to Aigun on the Russian border. American 
bankers, headed by J.P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co., 
were to finance the railroad; a British construction firm was 
to build it. 
It was this railroad project that Philander C. Knox, then 
Secretary of State, attempted to use as a springboard for one 
of the most ambitious schemes in American diplomacy. Speak-
ing for the American bankers, Knox proposed that China 
borrow money from the principal powers for the purpose of 
buying all the foreign controlled railroads in Manchuria. He 
proposed that representatives of the powers supervise the rail-
roads during the term of the loan. This scheme for taking 
the Manchurian railways from Russia and Japan and placing 
them in the hands of American and British bankers went 
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under the euphonious name of "neutralization." Fine words, 
decided Russia and Japan, are very lovely; but railroads are 
railroads. The Czarist government flatly rejected the Knox 
proposals, declaring that "the establishment of international 
administration and control of the Manchurian railroads would 
seriously injure Russian interests," ~nd that the proposed 
Chinchow-Aigun railroad had distinct "strategic and political" 
importance damaging to the interests of the Chinese Eastern. 
The Japanese protest was equally strong and when Britain 
and France supported their allies, Japan and Russia, the 
United States was compelled to drop the Chinchow-Aigun 
proposal and the Knox scheme. The "neutralization" scheme 
was dropped only temporarily. As we shall see later, "neutral-
ization" remained the keynote of American policy in Man-
churia. 
Consortiums 
Although defeated in their attempts to acquire control of 
Manchuria's railroads, American bankers succeeded in a simul-
taneous struggle to participate in a six power loan (con-
sortium) for Chinese currency reform and for the promotion 
of industrial enterprises in Manchuria. But this victory was 
also short-lived. The American bankers were forced to with-
draw from the consortium when President Wilson in a state-
ment issued March, 1913, withdrew the support of the Ameri-
can government, declaring that the conditions of the loan 
"seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative inde-
pendence of China itself." Wilson's decision reflected the 
dominant capitalistic interests of the United States, which at 
the time were manufacturing and commercial rather than 
financial. After the World War, when the United States 
emerged as a large capital-exporting country, Wilson changed 
his tune and inspired the formation of a new consortium. 
In the meantime, American attempts to penetrate Man-
churia alarmed Russia and Japan and forced the two powers, 
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who a few years earlier had fought a bloody war, into a 
virtual alliance. Japan recognized northern Manchuria as a 
Russian sphere of influence, in return for which Russia recog-
nized South Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of influence. 
The two powers presented a solid front in opposition to the 
Harriman schemes and the Knox "neutralization" proposals. 
During this period, Japan extended her influence in Man-
churia and acquired control of a number of important railroads 
together with valuable mining and lumber concessions. In 
1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the powers 
with the war in Europe to present China with an ultimatum 
demanding among other things the right to purchase land in 
South Manchuria, an option on all railway construction and 
loans in South Manchuria, and 99-year leases of Port Arthur 
and Dairen. China resisted for four months. Then when Japan 
threatened war, she granted the Japanese demands in treaties 
signed May 25, 1915. 
Effects of the Bolshevik Revolution 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 marked a new phase 
in the international relations of Manchuria. The Russian 
workers and peasants overthrew Russian capitalism and with 
it the imperialist exploitation of colonial peoples. In the place 
of imperialist Russia stood the Soviet Union offering to deal 
with China and other colonial countries on terms of com-
plete equality. 
The imperialist powers left no stone unturned in their 
effort to overthrow the workers' and peasants' government, 
which challenged the very existence of capitalism. A barrage 
of lying propaganda, blockades, subsidized counter-revolu-
tions and actual military intervention were all tried in an 
effort to restore capitalism in Russia. 
At the same time the imperialist powers saw an opportu-
nity to seize some of the Czarist spoils for which they hun-
gered. By agreements with China in March and September, 
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1918, Japan established a joint Sino-Japanese bureau to make 
"arrangements" for the transportation of troops to Siberia 
where the United States, Japan and other allied powers were 
cooperating with the White Guards. While cooperating against 
the U.S.S.R., the allied powers were suspiciously watching one 
another. The United .States, fearing that Japan was extend-
ing its influence in northern Manchuria and Siberia, pro-
posed that an inter-allied commission supervise the Siberian 
railways, including the Chinese Eastern. In January, 1919, 
an inter-allied commission was formed consisting of repre-
sentatives of each of the powers having troops in Siberia. 
This general agreement provided for two boards, a Technical 
Board and a Military Transportation Board, the former for 
the purpose of "administering technical and economic" man-
agement of the railways, and the latter for coordinating mili-
tary transportation. This system was put into effect in March, 
1919. John F. Stevens, an American engineer, was made presi-
dent of the Technical Board. 
Simultaneously, American attempts to penetrate Man-
churia were revealed in the proposals for a new consortium, 
revived by President Wilson, who in 1913 had opposed Amer-
ican participation because the consortium threatened the "ad-
ministrative independence" of China. American-Japanese ri-
valry in the Far East was apparent throughout the course of 
the consortium negotiations. Japan at first sought to exclude 
South Manchuria from the scope of the· consortium; but was 
unsuccessful. After long negotiations, she had to content her-
self with assurances from the United States and Britain that 
they would not countenance any action by the consortium 
that was prejudicial to the national defense and economic 
welfare of Japan. These assurances were broad and elastic 
enough for any interpretation. 
The new four-power consortium signed in 1920 contained 
no special reservations regarding Manchuria and was there-
fore a diplomatic victory for the United States, which had 
at last won the right to participate in the financing of Man-
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churian railways. This was not merely a paper victory. Even 
though the consortium in the five years of its existence floated 
no loan affecting Manchuria, those provinces remain a field 
for railroad investment. It is a country with a rapidly grow-
ing population and with rich natural resources. At the end 
of the 19th century the population of Manchuria was only 
r4,ooo,ooo; by 1927 the population had increased to 24,-
soo,ooo. The rich soil of central Manchuria is attracting mil-
lions of Chinese immigrants from the crowded provinces of 
Chihli and Shantung. In the growth of Manchuria, railroads 
play a vital role and offer an excellent field for investment. 
The United States won its diplomatic victory at the cost 
of Japanese suspicion and hatred. American-Japanese rivalry 
in the Far East was extremely acute. Both countries launched 
large naval construction programs. Those were the days of 
the "Yellow Peril," when the jingo press of this country 
yelped for war with Japan. Diplomats and admirals frankly 
talked about the possibility of war. This situation culmi-
nated in the Washington Conference of 1921-I922. The Japa-
nese, realizing that they could not compete with the United 
States in naval construction, agreed to evacuate Siberia and 
recognize the principles of the "open door" as applying to 
Manchuria as well as other parts of China. 
On the question of the Chinese Eastern the United States 
was less successful. The American delegation tried to push 
through a proposal that smacked of the Knox "neutraliza-
tion" scheme. It called for an international finance committee 
which should "exercise general financial control and be en-
trusted with the trusteeship which was assumed in 1919 and 
which cannot be relinquished until general recognition by 
the powers of a Russian government." Had this plan been 
successfully carried out, the Chinese Eastern would still be 
under the control of the imperialist powers, since no general 
recognition of the Soviet Union has occurred. The Chinese 
delegates balked at this proposal and compelled the confer-
ence to adopt a meaningless resolution for the better "pro-
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tection of the railroad." At the same time the other powers 
adopted a resolution reserving the "right to insist hereafter 
upon the responsibility of China for the performance or non-
performance of obligations towards foreign stockholders, 
bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern.". Thus 
for the second time the United States was unsuccessful in 
its attempts to "neutralize" the Chinese Eastern Railway. 
In October of the same year, inter-allied supervision of the 
Chinese Eastern was brought to a close and the railroad was 
administered under an agreement between China and the 
white guard directors of the Russo-Asiatic Bank who had 
fled to Paris after the revolution. The emigres claimed owner-
ship of the railways even though they owned only a very 
small portion of the stock of the Russo-Asiatic Bank and 
even though the Soviet Government had nationalized all of 
the Russian banks. 
The Soviet Union and China Make a Treaty 
While the imperialists were quarreling over Chinese 
spoils, the U.S.S.R. negotiated with China for relations be-
tween the two countries on terms of complete equality and 
for the revision of all unequal treaties foisted upon China 
by the Czarist government. In treaties signed in May, 1924, 
the Soviet Union renounced all special privileges and con-
cessions in China, surrendered its extraterritorial rights and 
gave up all claims to the indemnities wrested from China 
after the Boxer rebellion. The two countries also signed an 
agreement providing for joint operation of the Chinese East-
ern, in which the U.S.S.R. returned to China all of the privi-
leges wrested by the Czars, including the maintenance of 
troops in the railway area. The U.S.S.R. agreed to assume 
responsibility for all debts incurred before 1917. Soon after 
the agreements were concluded, the new management intro-
duced the eight-hour day on the railroad and other measures 
for the protection of the workers. (The Chinese Eastern is 
16 
still the only railroad in China where the eight-hour day 
prevails.) Schools and houses were built for workers and 
trade unions and cooperative organizations established. 
The powers which clung to their privileges regarded the 
Soviet Union's policy with respect to colonial peoples as a 
blow to imperialist exploitation, which is such an essential 
part of modern capitalist economy. Even before the final 
signature of the May treaties, several governments, including 
the United States, protested to China claiming that the 
treaties violated the Washington Conference resolution hold-
ing China responsible for the debts of the Chinese Eastern 
Railway. (China, it will be remembered, had never agreed 
to the resolution.) 
The United States protest was based on claims that the 
United States had spent about four million dollars on the 
Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways under the authority 
of the Inter-Allied Technical Board. This was a doubtful 
claim, to say the least, since the board had spent the money to 
further its military expedition against the Soviet Union. In 
reply to the American protest, China reminded the United 
States that matters concerning the Chinese Eastern were for 
the disposition of the U.S.S.R. and China alone. 
The relations between the U.S.S.R. and China, although 
officially friendly, were frequently strained after the signing 
of the treaties. From 1924 to 1927, there were many cases of 
treaty violations by the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-lin. 
The Manchurian authorities continued to protect and encour-
age the organization of military detachments of Russian 
Tsarist emigres. In 1925, the manager of the Chinese Eastern 
Railroad, a Soviet citizen, was arrested because he refused to 
transport Chang's troops without payment. 
While the imperialists and the war lords intrigued against 
the Soviet Union, workers', peasants', students', and even mid-
dle class organizations hailed the Soviet Union as the friend of 
Chinese nationalism. In 192 5, the Central Committee of the 
Kuomintang, which at that time was still conducting a genuine 
I7 
struggle for Chinese nationalism, passed a resolution declaring 
that the only government with which it coufd cooperate was 
the U.S.S.R. 
The Kuomintang Betrays the Revolution 
The amicable relations between the Soviet Union and the 
Kuomintang lasted until that organization betrayed the 
Chinese revolution and became a counter-revolutionary 
medium for imperialist intrigue. In 1926 and early in 1927, 
the nationalist armies swept northwards from their base in 
Canton and gained control of the Yangtse Valley. More sig-
nificant than the military victories was the awakening of the 
millions of workers and peasants throughout southern and 
central China. Hundreds of labor and peasant unions sprang 
into being. Gigantic strikes shut down the mills where men, 
women and children had toiled twelve, fourteen and sixteen 
hours a day. Chinese as well as foreign owned mills were 
closed. It was at this point that the Chinese bourgeoisie and 
the careerist generals of the Kuomintang betrayed the na-
tionalist movement, butchered thousands of workers' and 
peasants' leaders, and set up a reactionary government at 
Nanking. Since 1927, the Chinese war lords, affiliated and 
unaffiliated with the Kuomintang, have repeatedly violated 
their treaties with the Soviet Union. They have raided Soviet 
diplomatic quarters, arrested and murdered Soviet citizens and 
looted Soviet property. In April, 1927, the Chinese authorities, 
with the written permission of the foreign diplomatic corps, 
raided the Soviet consulate in Peking. The Soviet Government 
in a protest note expressed its policy towards China-a policy 
to which it has since consistently adhered. The Soviet note 
said: 
Any imperialist government representatives having been submitted 
to similar acts of violence, would have retaliated with acts of most 
atrocious reprisals. Though the Soviet Government possesses suf-
ficient technical resources to resort to enforcing its demands by 
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repressive measures, it nevertheless declares that it positively de-
sists from such measures. . . . The Soviet Government was, is, and 
will be guided in its policy by the interests of the toiling masses 
of the whole world and among others by the interests of the Chinese 
people and the working classes of all countries. In reply to the 
Peking provocation, the Soviet Government declares that it will not 
let itself be provoked by anybody and will by all means maintain 
peace among the nations. The Soviet Government does not doubt 
that in its endeavor to maintain peace it will have the concerted 
support of the toiling masses of all countries, and among others, 
first of all the people of China and of the U.S.S.R. ' 
The Soviet Government recalled its charge d'affaires and 
thereafter maintained only consular relations with China. 
Nevertheless the provocative raids on Soviet diplomatic quar-
ters continued. In December, 1927, the Kuomintang war lords 
raided the Soviet consulate in Canton and arrested the con-
sul-general. The strained relations between the U.S.S.R. and 
China continued until in 1929 they culminated in the seizure 
of the Chinese Eastern by the Chinese and the subsequent 
critical situation marked by the intervention of the powers. 
Mr. Stimson and the Kellogg Pact 
Economically the United States is the most powerful 
nation in the world. Its rapid rise to world supremacy, its 
emergence as the money center and chief manufacturing and 
exporting nation of the world is a story that has been fre-
quently told. The United States has been less proficient in the 
development of political instruments for expressing its world 
hegemony. Many of its policies still trail the umbilical cords 
of the nineteenth century which gave them birth. Now the 
United States is attempting to make up for this deficiency; it 
is revising old policies; whipping old doctrines into conformity 
with its role as the most powerful imr}erialist nation in the 
world. In opposition to the League of Nations dominated by 
British and French imperialism, the United States, under the 
guise of promoting world peace, is developing the Kellogg 
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Pact as an instrument for expressing its world hegemony. In 
the dispute between the Soviet Union and China resulting 
from the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railroad by the 
Chinese, the United States intervened in spite of the opposition 
of Japan and Germany, with two purposes in view: (1) to 
revive its old schemes for the "neutralization" of the Chinese 
Eastern; ( 2) to develop the Kellogg Pact as a powerful 
weapon against its imperialist rivals. 
As regards the second point, the well-informed correspondent 
of the Baltimore Sun who reported the London Conference 
wrote, late in December, 1929, as follows: 
Put briefly, the situation as viewed unofficially here is that the 
United States within the past summer has set up a Kellogg Pact 
machinery for maintaining the peace of the world which threatens to 
rival the League of Nations. 
This machinery, despite the fact that the French scornfully point 
out that it rests only on public opinion, is a powerful one when 
dominated by the United States. Furthermore, Mr. Stimson has in-
dicated that the United States intends to dominate it as long as the 
Hoover Administration remains in office. 
Under this machinery, the United States, and the United States 
alone, can decide whether it will throw its weight against a nation 
embroiled in a dispute threatening the Kellogg Pact. To do this, it 
does not need to take any vote on the question; it does not even 
need to have the approval of all of the major powers, as illustrated 
by the disapproval of Japan and Germany in advance of Secretary 
Stimson's action regarding Manchuria. Finally, the machine is one 
against which not even the United States Senate has raised its voice. 
As opposed to this, the League of Nations machinery, which France 
sees subordinated ... is a mechanism partly controlled by her. 
The motives of the United States in intervening in the 
Manchurian dispute can hardly be regarded as altruistic. It is 
even possible that American interests played some role in the 
seizure of the Chinese Eastern. Let us examine the dispute and 
the nature of American intervention. 
On May 2 7, Chinese police broke into the Soviet consulate 
in Harbin, searched the premises, seized part of the corre-
spondence of the consulate and arrested 39 Soviet citizens, in-
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eluding a number of officials of the Chinese Eastern. The 
Soviet Union sharply protested against the raid and announced 
that in the future it would not recognize the extraterritorial 
status of the Chinese embassy and consulates in the U.S.S.R. 
While expressing its friendship for the Chinese people, the 
Soviet Government warned the Nanking regime against "fur-
ther trying the patience of the government of the U.S.S.R. by 
provocative actions and the violation of treaties and agree-
ments." 
The Chinese war lords disregarded the Soviet warning. 
Early in July, Chiang Kai-shek, the Nanking war lord, Chang 
Hseuh-liang, virtual ruler of Manchuria, and Yen Shi-shan, a 
powerful and ambitious military leader who was awaiting an 
opportune moment to strike at Chiang, conferred in Peking 
and apparently decided to seize the Chinese Eastern. The 
motives of the war lords differed. Chiang, it seems, hoped to 
unite the rival war lords by means of a common cause against 
the Soviet Union and to strengthen the Nanking regime as 
spokesman for China. Chang Hseuh-liang believed that the 
seizure would strengthen his position in Manchuria. On July 
10 the Chinese broke their treaty pledges and seized the 
Chinese Eastern Railroad on the pretext that the Soviet Union 
was carrying on Communist propaganda in Manchuria. 
Chinese police seized the Soviet trade offices, destroyed the 
trade union and cooperative organizations on the Chinese 
Eastern and replaced the Soviet manager and assistant man-
ager of the railroad with Chinese. 
Railroad Interests 
It is not unlikely that American interests were connected 
with the seizure of the railroad. On April 4, three months 
before the Chinese confiscated the Chinese Eastern, the New 
York Times announced that the Nanking government had 
consulted American railroad interests with regard to the re-
2I 
organization of the railroad along "American lines." It had 
selected J. J. Mantell, formerly vice-president of the Erie 
Railroad, chiefly distinguished for breaking the Erie railway-
men's strike of 1920, to survey the Chinese government rail-
roads including the Chinese Eastern. The Times neglected to 
mention that the "railroad interests" consulted by the Nanking 
government consisted of W. W. Atterbury, president of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, and L. F. Loree, president of the 
Delaware and Hudson Company and its thirty-nine subsidia-
ries. Atterbury and Loree are two of the most aggressive rail-
road magnates in the country. Both are interested in the 
development and control of railroads abroad. It is quite pos-
sible that there was no connection between the Mantell visit 
and the seizure of the railroad; on the other hand, the hy-
pothesis that these events were not unrelated is strengthened 
by the traditional interest of American railroad magnates and 
diplomats in the Chinese Eastern as an important "artery 
of commerce" between Europe and the Far East. From the 
days of Harriman and Knox to those of Atterbury and Stim-
son, the United States has consistently sought the "neutraliza-
tion" of the Chinese Eastern. 
Whether or not American interests were in any way con-
nected with the seizure is yet unknown. But there is evidence 
that the United States took advantage of the dispute between 
the U.S.S.R. and China to revive its old proposals for the 
"neutralization" of the railroad and when these fell through 
did everything possible to hinder a settlement of the conflict. 
Sino-Soviet relations reached a critical stage immediately 
after the seizure of the railroad because of the Chinese re-
fusal to restore the status quo and negotiate its dispute with 
the Soviet Union. Three days after the Chinese militarists 
seized the railroad, the Soviet Union addressed a sharp note 
to China demanding the release of arrested Soviet citizens, 
a conference to regulate all questions concerning the railroad 
and the "immediate cancellation of all arbitrary orders re-
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garding the railroad." The Soviet note demanded a reply 
within three days. The Chinese answer was an insolent de-
fense of the seizure of the railroad and an evasion of the 
Soviet Union's demands for a conference. On July 17 the 
Soviet Union recalled its diplomatic and commercial repre-
sentatives in China and suspended railway communications 
between the two countries. During this exchange of diplomatic 
notes, detachments of Chinese and White Russian troops were 
mobilizing on the border. 
It was at this stage that the United States first intervened. 
On July 18, after preliminary conversations with the powers, 
the United States Government reminded China and the Soviet 
Union (through France, since the United States still refuses 
to recognize the U.S.S.R.) that they were signatories of the 
Kellogg Pact and expressed the hope that the U.S.S.R. and 
China would settle their dispute peaceably. Both promised to 
remain mindful of their obligations under the Kellogg Pact. 
The basis for the action of the United States government 
was not quite clear, since the Kellogg Pact had not yet gone 
into effect. State Department officials advanced several theories 
for the action of the United States. They first intimated that 
the interest of the United States in the Manchurian crisis 
was based on the Four-Power Treaty signed at the Washing-
tion Conference under which the United States, Great Britain, 
France and Japan agreed to "communicate fully and frankly" 
with respect to matters threatening their insular possessions 
in the Pacific. This explanation was obviously too thin and 
was subsquently abandoned. Then it was announced that in 
intervening, the United States was solely concerned with the 
terms of the Kellogg Pact. To the Kellogg Pact explanation, 
Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the 
State Department, subsequently added another excuse for 
American intervention. 
':By reason of the trusteeship assumed and exercised with 
regard to the Chinese Eastern during years 1919-1922," Horn-
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beck declared, "the powers which participated in the Siberian 
expedition, among them the United States, have a natural 
concern, moral, at least, legal to some, with regard to develop-
ments which affect the Chinese Eastern Railway." 
This explanation is extremely interesting since the United 
States could on this basis claim a "moral" and possibly 
"legal" concern in the trans-Siberian railroad (on Soviet soil), 
parts of which were under the beneficent "trusteeship" of 
the powers participating in the Siberian expedition. 
The Secret "Aide Memoire" 
Far more important that his communication of July 18 
was a secret aide memoire which Stimson handed to the 
diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Japan, France, 
Germany and Italy just one wee~ later. The contents of the 
document were never made public, but their nature was re-
vealed in press reports in various capitals, presumably ema-
nating from the Japanese and German foreign offices. In its 
issue of August 7, the Moscow Pravda printed a despatch 
from Vienna declaring that Stimson's aide memoire had pro-
posed the appointment of a neutral commission to study the 
Manchurian dispute, that both Soviet and Chinese troops re-
frain from hostile action and that a body of five Soviet 
citizens and five Chinese headed by a neutral chairman 
operate the Chinese Eastern. Similar reports had appeared 
several days earlier in the Japanese press. The well-informed 
correspondent of the Baltimore Sun even charged that this 
secret note had contained a veiled suggestion that the powers 
assist China in purchasing the railroad. (Although the Sino-
Soviet agreements permit China to purchase the railroad in 
19,32, they explicitly state that the purchase must be made 
with Chinese funds.) 
The State Department never denied these charges. It main-
tained a discreet silence about the contents of the aide 
24 
mernoire and even refused to admit that such a document 
existed. Hornbeck, in a speech about the Manchurian crisis, 
referred to the press reports concerning its existence. "I am 
not in any position to make any statement on that point," he 
said. However, he did discuss the general position of the 
United States regarding Manchurian railway politics. The 
United States, he said, owns no railways in Manchuria nor 
does it have any appreciable investments in Manchurian rail-
ways. Then he added: 
Concerning the Chinese Eastern, it needs to be remembered that 
physically and economically, it is not an independent railway unit; 
it is a link in the one and only direct railway route from Europe, 
across Siberia to the Asiatic ports of the Pacific Ocean. Concern-
ing the South Manchurian line, it needs to be remembered that it 
is the link between the trans-Siberian line and the ports and terri-
tories of China and Japan. These lines, therefore, no matter who 
built them or who owns them or who administers them, are not 
exclusively of Russian or exclusively of Japanese concern. They were 
born in and of international politics. They serve not alone the people 
or purposes of any one country. They are "public carriers" in a 
much broader sense than that which is usually connoted by that ex-
pression. One war has already been fought because of them-a war 
very expensive to the two belligerents and to the country upon whose 
soil it was fought. 
Hornbeck then emphasized "neutralization" as the tradi-
- tional policy of the United States in the international scram-
ble for Manchurian railways. He stressed the Knox proposals 
of 1909 and the inter-allied supervision of the Chinese East-
ern from 1919-1922. The State Department refuses to discuss 
the secret notes of July 2 5 but Hornbeck's speech suggests 
the general nature of their contents. 
According to the Baltimore Sun, Japan, Britain and Ger-
many rejected the American proposals. Certainly the Japa-
nese press made it clear that Japan resented the Stimson 
proposals for international action in the Chinese Eastern dis-
pute just as she had resented the Knox proposals of 1909. 
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The Red Army Speaks 
In the meantime, Chinese and White Guard detachments 
crossed the Soviet border and raided Russian villages. The 
Chinese authorities in Harbin arrested thousands of Soviet 
citizens. Soviet notes to Germany cited numerous border 
raids by the Chinese and the murder of scores of Soviet citi-
zens. Through Germany, the Soviet Union repeatedly warned 
China against further depredations but the Chinese disre-
garded these warnings, and continued their attacks. Then the 
Soviet Union retaliated. Red Army detachments repulsed the 
Chinese forces, crossed the border and pushed their way into 
Manchuria. The Chinese retreated, looting towns as they 
went. Having driven the Chinese far back into Manchuria, 
the Red Army detachments began to withdraw. 
Apparently the Chinese war lords were more readily per-
suaded by this show of force than by the series of diplomatic 
protests which preceded it, for on November 2 I the press 
reported that Chang Hseuh-liang, the Manchurian war lord, 
was seeking to negotiate a settlement of the railroad dispute. 
On December 2, as the negotiations were proceeding and 
the Soviet troops completing their evacuation from Man-
churia, the United States appealed to China and the Soviet 
Union to settle the dispute peacefully and pointed to their 
promises under the Kellogg Pact. 
"The American government feels," the American communi-
cation said, "that the respect with which China and Russia 
will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will 
necessarily in great measure depend upon the way in which 
they carry out these most sacred promises." 
Stimson's gratuitous intervention was puzzling. For several 
days before the United States despatched its communication, 
it was apparent that the Soviet Union and China were nego-
tiating for peaceful settlement of their dispute. Even State 
Department officials acknowledged that a peaceful settlement 
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appeared to be near. State Department claims that the United 
States was not informed of the negotiations are curious in 
view of the press reports from various capitals reporting and 
commenting on the imminent settlement of the dispute. On 
November 2 7, the Associated Press reported from Moscow 
that negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily. Two days 
later the A.P. correspondent in Paris reported that the United 
States, France and other powers had agreed to intervene but 
had changed their plans because "Moscow and Mukden 
opened direct negotiations." On the same day, Litvinov, act-
ing Commissar of Foreign Affairs, handed the German am-
bassador a note replying to the offer of the Nanking gov-
ernment to negotiate the dispute and saying that since the 
governor of Manchuria had agreed to Soviet terms, Nanking's 
belated offers to settle the dispute amicably were superfluous. 
Even reports from Washington, dated November 29, an-
nounced that the State Department had received information 
that Soviet troop movements were small· and that the situa-
tion was not critical. These and numerous other reports ap-
peared in the press. The State Department was perfectly 
aware that the U.S.S.R. and Mukden were negotiating for 
a peaceful settlement. Why then did the State Department 
urge the Soviet Union and China to do precisely what they 
were doing? One explanation advanced in the Soviet press is 
that the United States desired to interfere with the nego-
tiations. Another explanation is that the United States wished 
to take advantage of the situation to strengthen the Kellogg 
Pact and. establish a precedent for American intervention in 
international disputes. 
Great Britain and France associated themselves with the 
United States and sent notes to the Soviet Union and China. 
Germany and Japan refused to follow the lead of the United 
States ; both indicating that the invocation of the Kellogg 
Pact was superfluous in view of the direct negotiations be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and China. 
In its reply to the Stimson note, the Soviet Union de-
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dared that the United States had intervened at a moment 
when the U.S.S.R. and the Manchurian government were con-
ducting direct negotiations for a settlement of their dispute 
and pointed out that the Kellogg Pact did not authorize any 
single state or group of states to act as the guardian of the 
Pact. The Soviet note declared that the dispute between the 
U.S.S.R. and China could only be settled by direct negotia-
tions of the two powers concerned and expressed "amaze-
ment that the United States, which by its own will has no 
official relations with the Soviet Union deems it possible to 
apply to it with advice and counsel." The Soviet note was 
dated December 3· On the same day-one day after Stimson's 
intervention-a preliminary agreement for the settlement of 
the dispute was reached. The Mukden government agreed to 
adhere to the 1924 treaties and to dismiss the Chinese chair-
man of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern. 
The next day Stimson in a statement to the press in reply 
to the Soviet memorandum had the temerity to suggest that 
the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Mukden showed 
that the "public opinion of the world is a live factor which 
can promptly be mobilized and which has become a factor 
of prime importance in the solution of problems and contro-
versies which may arise between nations." 
On December 22, China and the U.S.S.R. signed a protocol 
providing for the restoration of the status quo with regard 
to the administration of the Chinese Eastern. 
Kellogg Pact-Weapon of Imperialist Struggle 
American intervention in the Manchurian dispute revealed 
a new trend in American foreign policy; it revealed the de-
liberate attempt of the United States to strengthen the Kel-
logg Pact as a weapon in its struggle for world domination. 
The United States is not a member of the League of Nations, 
which is controlled by France and Britain. In opposition to 
the League, the United States must create an international 
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political instrument which it can manipulate. The necessity 
for such a policy becomes greater as the conflict between the 
United States and its imperialist rivals grows more acute. 
The Kellogg Pact, literally interpreted, is a meaningless 
document. In vague language it "obliges" its signatories to 
renounce war as an "instrument of national policy." As a 
"peace pact" it means nothing except in so far as it pro-
vides imperialist statesmen with material for bombastic 
hypocritical speeches about "peace," arouses pacifist illusions 
and creates a smoke screen for the very diligent war prepara-
tions now in progress. But in the hands of the United States, 
the Kellogg Pact becomes not merely a smoke screen, but an 
effective instrument in the American struggle for world domi-
nation. Stimson's actions in the Manchurian dispute revealed 
that the United States intends to use the pact as an excuse 
for intervention in international disputes. What methods of 
intervention can the United States use under the Kellogg 
Pact? According to press reports Stimson's note of July z 5 
suggested that an international committee investigate the 
Manchurian dispute. The State Department never denied 
these charges. The press also reported that Britain, Japan and 
Germany flatly rejected Stimson's proposal, indicating that 
the other imperialist powers refuse to permit the United 
States to interpret the Kellogg Pact to suit its own interests. 
Faced with this opposition, the United States is seeking to 
"supplement" or "implement" the Kellogg treaty. Edwin L. 
James, London correspondent for the New York Times, re-
portS! that in November, 1929, Stimson actually suggested to 
the French government that steps be taken to strengthen the 
pact. James writes: 
Last fall when Washington .invoked the Kellogg Pact in the Russo-
Chinese dispute, Mr. Stimson found a lack in the anti-war pact. 
Based upon the force of public opinion, he saw that in order that 
public opinion should make its force felt, it must have facts, and 
in the Manchurian dispute it did not have facts. He then suggested 
to M. Briand through Ambassador Claudel that provision should be 
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made for inquiry and report. He still believes in the wisdom of this 
policy, and, indeed, so does President Hoover. The French Foreign 
Minister found it not feasible to renew these discussions at length 
with Mr. Stimson here (London), for fear of complications. But who 
will deny that he takes away from London very good assurance that 
in the future-perhaps when the Senate has done with the naval 
treaty-Washington and Paris may resume this project of giving 
effect to the anti-war treaty. 
In attempting to strengthen the Kellogg Pact as an instru-
ment against the Soviet Union and rival imperialist powers, 
and revive her scheme for the "neutralization" of the Chinese 
Eastern, the United States further antagonized her imperi-
alist rivals. Japan resented Stimson's attempt to intervene in 
Manchuria, which she regards as her sphere of influence. 
The "Russian Menace" 
But if Japan opposed Stimson's scheme, it is not because 
she has any love for the Soviet Union. Throughout the con-
tinuous squabbling at the London Naval Conference, the 
powers were unanimous on only one point-the "Russian 
menace." Edward Price Bell, correspondent for the Chicago 
Daily News, describes the U.S.S.R. as a "vast invisible pres-
ence occupying the thoughts of all the delegates"; a presence 
producing an "excellent effect" on the conference because 
"it is tending to create a sense of community in the five powers 
of highest maritime rank." He explains that Japan fears pos-
sible aggression from the Soviet Union through Siberia and 
that the stronger Japan becomes "the safer it will be should 
Russia turn dangerous." Italy and France, he continues, are 
strongly anti-Soviet, and Germany, like Japan, fears Soviet 
aggression. Therefore, says Bell, the United States and Great 
Britain are protected on both flanks-in western Europe and 
in the Far East-against the Soviet Union. "The peril to 
either ·Britain or America from Russia may seem too remote 
for practical discussion but far less remote than it seems. 
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Bolshevik agitation continues ceaselessly throughout the 
world." 
Certainly the United States and Great Britain do not fear 
military invasion from the Soviet Union. What they are 
afraid of is "Bolshevik agitation"; that is, the international 
working class movement. The struggle of the Indian and 
Chinese masses to free themselves "from imperialist domina-
tion makes this fear particularly acute at the present mo-
ment. And it is because the Soviet Union represents the first 
realization of the aspirations of the working class that the 
powers plot its destruction. It is an exaggeration to state, as 
Bell does, that the United States wishes to see a stronger 
Japanese navy because it fears Bolshevism. The London Con-
ference clearly showed that imperialist rivalries are keener 
than ever. But acute though these differences be they do not 
mitigate the danger of an imperialist attack against the Soviet 
Union. 
The War Danger 
As we have seen, the United States and Japan, despite their 
bitter rivalry in the Far East, cooperated with the White 
Guards in a military expedition in 1919 to overthrow the 
Soviet Government. A repetition of such an attack is more 
than likely. Japan has constructed art intricate network of 
railways in Manchuria which permits the rapid transportation 
of thousands of troops from Korea and South Manchuria to 
the Siberian border. French and British military strategists 
have undoubtedly worked out similar . plans for attack from 
the Baltic, Balkan and Near Eastern states. Precisely when 
these plans will be put into operation, precisely when the 
hatred of the imperialist powers will flare into an open war 
against the Soviet Union, no one can prophesy; but it is against 
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